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OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE AND THE SPIRIT
OF CAPITALISM*
MATTHIAS DOEPKE AND FABRIZIO ZILIBOTTI
The British Industrial Revolution triggered a socioeconomic transformation
whereby the landowning aristocracy was replaced by industrial capitalists rising
from the middle classes as the economically dominant group. We propose a theory
of preference formation under financial market imperfections that can account for
this pattern. Parents shape their children’s preferences in response to economic
incentives. Middle-class families in occupations requiring effort, skill, and experi-
ence develop patience and a work ethic, whereas upper-class families relying on
rental income cultivate a refined taste for leisure. These class-specific attitudes,
which are rooted in the nature of preindustrial professions, become key determi-
nants of success once industrialization transforms the economic landscape.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Industrial Revolution was more than capital accumula-
tion and growth. It also set off a social and political transformation
that redefined hierarchies in society and reshaped the distribu-
tion of income and wealth. Before the onset of industrialization in
eighteenth-century Britain, wealth and political power were as-
sociated with the possession of land. Over the course of the nine-
teenth century, a new class of entrepreneurs and businessmen
emerged as the economic elite. For the most part, the members of
this class rose from humble beginnings and had their social ori-
gins in the urban middle classes. The landed elite was left behind
and eventually lost its political and economic predominance.
Many observers of the time linked this reversal in economic
fortunes to differences in values, attitudes, and ultimately prefer-
ences across social classes. There are countless examples, both in
scholarly and in fictional writing, of portrayals of members of the
landowning class as averse to work, unwilling to save, ill-disposed
to commercial activity, and unable to considermoney as something
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to be profitably invested. In contrast, the new industrialists are
described as frugal, thrifty, and hard-working.1
The role of values and culture as determinants of socioeco-
nomic change is the subject of a long-standing debate in the so-
cial sciences. Karl Marx regarded economic relationships as the
“base of society” and viewed culture, religion, and ideology (the
“superstructure”) as mere reflections of the material interests of
the class in control of the means of production. Max Weber re-
versed Marx’s perspective and argued culture and religion to be
key driving forces in the development of modern capitalism.
In this paper, we develop a theory of preference formation that
is rooted in the rational-choice paradigm and ask whether such
a theory can help explain the socioeconomic transformation that
accompanied the Industrial Revolution. In our theory the link be-
tween economic conditions and cultural values (or, more precisely,
class-specific preferences) runs both ways. On one hand, differ-
ences in preferences across social classes are a key determinant
of socioeconomic change. But on the other hand, these preferences
and values are themselves shaped by the economic conditions that
the members of different social classes face.2 When applied to the
Industrial Revolution, our theory predicts both the initial diver-
gence of preferences across social classes and the ensuing reversal
of economic fortunes as equilibrium outcomes.
We construct a model where altruistic parents strive to shape
their children’s preferences in a way that best fits with their
future material circumstances. We focus on two key aspects of
preferences: the rate of time preference (patience) and the taste
for leisure (or, conversely, work ethic). Parental investments in
patience interact with the steepness of lifetime income profiles.
1. Adam Smith (1976, p. 432) writes, for instance, “A merchant is accustomed
to employ his money chiefly in profitable projects; whereas a mere country gentle-
man is accustomed to employ it chiefly in expense. The one often sees his money go
from him and return to him again with a profit: the other, when once he parts with
it, very seldom expects to see any more of it.” In a study of early industrialists,
Crouzet (1985, p. 37) cites accounts of the time relating that Mancunian manu-
facturers of the late eighteenth century “ . . . commenced their careers in business
with but slender capitals. . . .Patience, industry and perseverance was their prin-
cipal stock.”
2. Although his work focuses mainly on the effects of culture on economic
outcomes, Weber acknowledges the possibility of a two-way relationship and sug-
gested, for instance, that religious factors may themselves be influenced by eco-
nomic conditions: “It would also further be necessary to investigate how Protestant
Asceticism was in turn influenced in its development and its character by the to-
tality of social conditions, especially economic . . . it is, of course, not my aim to
substitute for a one-sided materialistic an equally one-sided spiritualistic causal
interpretation of culture and of history” (Weber 1958, p. 183).
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Lifetime earnings are relatively flat in some professions, whereas
high returns are achieved only late in life in others, in particular
those requiring the acquisition of skills. A parent’s incentive for
investing in a child’s patience increases in the steepness of the
child’s future income profile. Conversely, a child endowed with
high patience is more likely to enter a profession entailing the
accumulation of skill and, hence, the delay of material rewards.
Parental investments in children’s taste for leisure hinge on the
role of labor effort. Parents who expect their children to be wholly
reliant on labor income will tend to instill them with a strong
work ethic, that is, a tolerance for hard work and a reduced taste
for leisure. In contrast, parents who anticipate their children to be
rentiers with ample free timewill teach them to appreciate refined
leisure activities, from performing classical music to fox hunting.
The complementarities between patience and steep income
profiles and between the taste for leisure and low work effort im-
ply that, within a given dynasty, the choices of a specific occupa-
tion and of preferences suitable for that occupation are mutually
reinforcing over time. As a consequence, even if the population is
initially homogeneous, preferences gradually diverge across the
members of different occupations. Hence, the society is endoge-
nously stratified into “social classes” defined by occupations and
their associated preferences and values. The theory also implies
that the cultural divergence across social classes is related to fi-
nancial development. If people can borrow and lend in perfect
credit markets to smooth consumption, the link between occu-
pational choices and consumption profiles is severed. Thus, di-
vergence in patience across classes only emerges when financial
markets are shallow, whereas financial development leads tomore
homogeneous societies. This prediction accords with the broad ob-
servation that class differences are less accentuated in modern
industrial economies than in traditional societies.
The theory can account for the reversal in the economic for-
tunes of different social classes at the time of the Industrial
Revolution. For centuries, members of the preindustrial mid-
dle class—artisans, craftsmen, and merchants—had to sacrifice
consumption and leisure in their youth to acquire skills. In re-
sponse to this economic environment, the middle class developed
a system of preferences and values centered around parsimony,
the work ethic, and delay of gratification. For the landed up-
per class, in contrast, neither the work ethic nor patience was
particularly valuable because the members of this class could
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rely on fairly stable rental incomes from their estates. As a re-
sult, the landowning elite cultivated refined tastes for leisure and
grew less future-oriented. In an otherwise stationary society, such
differences in preferences and values had limited consequences.
However, patience and thework ethic became key assets—a “spirit
of capitalism”—when opportunities for economic advancement
through entrepreneurship and investment arose at the outset of
the Industrial Revolution. In an already stratified society, it was
members of the patient, hard-working middle class who made the
most of the new opportunities and ultimately gained economic
ascendency over the landed elite.
Although the theory predicts the triumph of the thrifty and
hard-working bourgeoisie at the outset of the Industrial Revo-
lution, it also implies that this success carries the seed of its
own destruction. Whereas first-generation entrepreneurs started
out poor, their descendants inherited the family business. The
founders’ children and grandchildren could thus rely on consid-
erable capital income, making them less dependent on their own
labor income. Just as for the landowners, this creates an incentive
to invest in the appreciation of leisure: the industrial dynasties
ultimately mimic the tastes of the old elite. In the extreme, this
effect can lead to the downfall of a dynasty (the “Buddenbrooks”
effect); at a minimum, the descendants will achieve less growth
than the founders.
Our theory is consistent with a number of observations on
the social history of Britain. For instance, well before industrial-
ization, members of the upper class displayed a low propensity to
save and accumulated debt, which suggests low patience. In addi-
tion, attitudes to work and leisure diverged over time between the
preindustrial upper andmiddle class. The perhapsmost telling ob-
servation is that once economic success was achieved after the In-
dustrial Revolution, the traditional middle-class work ethic gave
way to an increased taste for leisure and an imitation of upper-
class habits. This gentrification process ultimately lowered class
barriers to the point where intermarriage between members of
aristocratic and industrial dynasties became common fare.
Although we do not focus explicitly on religion, our theory is
related to Weber’s view that the spirit of capitalism was linked to
the values of the Protestant Reformation. Protestant values, and
especially Puritanism, were widespread among the urban upper-
middle classes and may have been instrumental in their economic
advancement. According to our theory, Puritanism was successful
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among these groups precisely because its values were compatible
with the economic conditions faced by these groups. The same
theory suggests that changing economic conditions should affect
the success and popularity of religion. In line with this prediction,
religious fervor among the middle classes declined in the late
nineteenth century at the same time when the middle-class work
ethic started to wane.3
In the following section, we relate our work to the existing
literature. In Section III we analyze the decision problem at the
heart of our theory in partial equilibrium. In Section IV, we embed
the choice problem into a general-equilibriummodel of a preindus-
trial economy and discuss the evolution of the economy through-
out the Industrial Revolution. Historical evidence and alternative
theories are discussed in Sections V and VI, and Section VII con-
cludes. All proofs are contained in the mathematical appendix,
which is available online.
II. RELATED LITERATURE
Ourwork contributes to the recent literature on the economics
of the Industrial Revolution (see Galor and Weil [2000], Hansen
and Prescott [2002], Doepke [2004], and Clark [2007]). As we do,
Clark views changing values and preferences as a key element of
the transition from a Malthusian era to a modern society: “As a
whole these changes show societies becoming increasingly mid-
dle class in their orientation. Thrift, prudence, negotiation and
hard work were imbuing themselves into communities that had
been spendthrift, violent, impulsive and leisure loving” (Clark
2007, p. 208). However, following Galor and Moav (2002), Clark
emphasizes genetic selection rather than conscious investment
as the mechanism for preference formation (see also Clark and
Hamilton [2006] and Galor and Michalopoulos [2006]). We view
selection and investment in preferences as complementary ap-
proaches because they operate on different time scales and lead
to distinct implications. The evolutionary literature is concerned
with changes in the composition of genetic traits that affect en-
tire populations and take place over long time horizons. Galor
3. This echoes Weber’s discussion of the secularizing influence of wealth.
Citing John Wesley, he writes: “Religion must necessarily produce both indus-
try and frugality, and these cannot but produce riches. But as riches increase, so
will . . . the love of the world in all its branches . . .Although the form of religion
remains, the spirit is swiftly vanishing away” (Weber 1958, p. 175).
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and Moav (2002), for instance, argue that selection pressures that
generated preferences favorable to economic growth have been
operating at least since the Neolithic Revolution nearly 10,000
years ago. In contrast, our focus is on the divergence of prefer-
ences across social classes, and our mechanism operates on a time
scale from two or three generations (the “Buddenbrooks” effect)
to, at most, a few centuries.
Our paper provides a new perspective on the effects of wealth
inequality on development in the face of financial market imper-
fections. A number of existing theories point out that if financial
markets are absent, poor individuals may be unable to finance
otherwise profitable investment projects and are therefore forced
to enter less productive professions (see Banerjee and Newman
[1993], Galor and Zeira [1993], Bertocchi [2006], and Matsuyama
[2006]). A common feature of this literature is that the rich, who
are least constrained by credit market imperfections, generally
do best and are the first beneficiaries of new investment opportu-
nities. Therefore, these theories cannot explain how a new class
of entrepreneurs rose from humble beginnings to leapfrog over
the landed preindustrial elite, at a time when wealth inequality
was quite extreme and financial markets were shallow by modern
standards.
Our theory is also related to a recent literature on the effects
of religious values on economic performance and income distribu-
tion. Using international survey data, Barro and McCleary (2003)
find that economic growth responds positively to the beliefs in hell
and heaven. One interpretation of this finding is that a habit of
contemplating the distant future generates individual behavior
favorable for economic performance. Similar findings are docu-
mented by Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2003)4 and Boppart
et al. (2007). In a different vein, Botticini and Eckstein (2005,
2007, forthcoming) argue that Jews originally specialized in ar-
tisanship, trade, and finance because of religious reforms that
fostered literacy among Jewish farmers. After the reforms, Jews
progressively migrated to towns to exploit their comparative ad-
vantage in education in skilled urban occupations. Thus, as in
our theory, group-specific values and attitudes have long-lasting
effects on economic decisions. However, the impetus in Botticini
and Eckstein is a cultural shock to a particular group (a reform in
4. According to the calibration analysis of Cavalcanti, Parente, and Zhao
(2007), differences in religious affiliation can explain some of the differences in
the timing and diffusion of the Industrial Revolution across countries.
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the Jewish religion), whereas our mechanism relies on economic
incentives faced by an initially homogeneous population. Turning
more specifically to Weber’s hypothesis, Becker and Woessmann
(2007) find that in nineteenth-century Prussia, Protestant coun-
ties were more prosperous than Catholic ones. However, the effect
of religion disappears when one controls for education, suggesting
that values affect economic performance mainly through the ac-
cumulation of human capital. Although we do not model religion
explicitly, our theory is consistent with this view.
The notion of patience as an asset that agents can invest in
was first introduced into the economic literature by Becker and
Mulligan (1997), who consider the problem of a consumer who
lives for a finite number of periods and makes a one-time choice
of a discount factor. In contrast, we embed the choice of patience
in a dynamic model of preference formation with the additional
dimensions of choosing an occupation and investing into the taste
for leisure.5 An alternative mechanism of preference transmis-
sion is advocated by the literature on cultural transmission (see
Bisin andVerdier [2001], Hauk andSaez-Marti [2002], Ferna´ndez,
Fogli, and Olivetti [2004], Saez-Marti and Zenou [2006], Grad-
stein [2007], Saez-Marti and Sjoegren [forthcoming], and Tabellini
[2007]). As in our work, parents’ incentives for forming their chil-
dren’s preferences depend on economic conditions. However, par-
ents invest because they desire to make their children’s behavior
conform with their own wishes. In our dynastic model, parents
judge their children’s choices solely through the children’s own
eyes: preference formation is a gift that altruistic parents pass on
to their children.
If patience and the work ethic are accumulated and trans-
mitted within dynasties, parents’ and children’s propensities to
save and invest should be positively correlated. This implication
is confirmed by Knowles and Postlewaite (2005), who show that in
the PSID parental savings behavior is an important determinant
5. Also related are Mulligan (1997), where parents choose their own level
of altruism toward their children, and Haaparanta and Puhakka (2004), where
agents invest in their own patience and in health. Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006)
focus on the negative effects of public transfers on parents’ incentives to instill a
work ethic in their children. Krusell and Stavlo¨t (2005) analyze the accumulation
of a taste for culture consumption and find that complementarities between cur-
rent and future culture consumption can lead to a multiplicity of steady states.
The macroeconomic consequences of inherited (as opposed to chosen) preferences
have been examined by de la Croix and Michel (1999, 2001) and Alonso-Carrera,
Caballe´, and Raurich (2007). In Artige, Camacho, and de la Croix (2004), inherited
consumption habits can lead to the downfall of a temporarily wealthy country or
region.
754 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
of their children’s education and savings choices, after controlling
for a variety of individual characteristics (see also Charles and
Hurst [2003], who study the correlation of wealth between par-
ents and children). Moreover, the correlation is stronger between
children and mothers, who are usually more involved in a child’s
upbringing than fathers. Our theory also posits that agents with
steeper income profiles are more patient. This is consistent with
the results of a field experiment conducted on Danish households
byHarrison, Lau, andWilliams (2002) showing that time discount
rates of highly educated adults (who tend to have steeper income
profiles) are about one-third lower than those of adults with less
education.6
Reyes-Garcia et al. (2007) study the effect of patience on
economic outcomes among the Tsimanes, an Amazonian tribal
society that only recently transitioned from self-sufficiency to
a market economy. They find that more patient individuals
were subsequently more likely to acquire formal education,
choose market-oriented occupations, and earn higher income (see
also Mischel, Shoda, and Rodriguez [1992]). A recent empirical
literature highlights the role of a broader set of noncognitive
skills, including both patience and work ethic, for economic
performance (see Heckman and Rubinstein [2001], Segal [2006],
and Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua [2006]). Coleman and Hoffer
(1983) argue that the emphasis on patience and self-discipline
is the key to the effectiveness of Catholic schools in the United
States. This literature also shows that noncognitive skills depend
on nurture and family upbringing.7
III. A MODEL OF OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE AND ENDOGENOUS
PREFERENCE FORMATION
In this section, we develop a theory of endogenous preference
formation that is driven by parents’ desire to instill certain tastes
6. Other evidence of a positive correlation between steep income profiles and
patience includes Carroll and Summers (1991) who document that in both Japan
and theUnited States consumption–age profiles are steeperwhen economic growth
is high, and Becker and Mulligan (1997), who show that consumption growth is
high for adults who have income themselves (which is associated with steep income
profiles) or who had rich parents.
7. See, in particular, Heckman (2000), Carneiro and Heckman (2003), who
review the evidence from a large number of programs targeting disadvantaged
children. Similar conclusions are reached by studies in child development psychol-
ogy, such as Shonkoff and Philips (2000) and Taylor, McGue, and Iacono (2000).
Dohmen et al. (2006) document evidence on the German Socio-Economic Panel
that trust and risk attitudes are transmitted from parents to children.
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into their children. We concentrate on two dimensions of prefer-
ences, the taste for leisure and patience. Investments in the taste
for leisure comprise all parental efforts that cultivate a child’s abil-
ity to enjoy free (nonworking) time. Examples are teaching one’s
child to swim, to play a sport, to ride a horse, or to play a musi-
cal instrument. Because a high appreciation of leisure raises the
opportunity cost of working, parental efforts in the opposite direc-
tion (those that lower the taste for leisure) can be interpreted as
increasing a child’s tolerance for hard work. Parents may achieve
this objective by preaching the virtues of an austere life.8 Invest-
ments in patience determine the weight that a child attaches, in
adult age, to utility late in life relative to the present. Instilling
parsimony and thrift into children are examples of this type of
investment. Religious ideas stressing the value of frugality and
industry—the “Protestant Ethic” of Max Weber—can also be re-
garded as vehicles for the accumulation of patience and the work
ethic.
In the theory, parents’ investments in their children’s pref-
erences respond to economic incentives. As a consequence, pref-
erence formation interacts with other economic decisions taken
by both parent and child. Our particular focus is on the question
of how preferences both determine and depend on the choice of
an occupation. With an eye to our historical application, we sep-
arately analyze the decision problem of agents who rely on wage
income alone (such as workers or artisans) and agents who also
receive rents (such as landowners).
III.A. Preferences, Timing, and Occupations
The model economy is populated by overlapping generations
of altruistic people who live for four periods, two as children and
two as adults. People work throughout both adult periods (young
and old), and their earnings may vary over time. Agents consume
and make economic decisions only when they are adults. At the
beginning of adulthood, every agent gives birth to a single child.
All adults have the same basic preferences. However, two
aspects of the preferences are endogenous, namely patience (the
relative weight of old versus young adult consumption in utility)
and the taste for leisure (the marginal utility of free time). These
8. Formally, we only model parental investments in a child’s taste for leisure;
a parent who wished to improve a child’s work ethic would simply do little or none
of this investment.
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FIGURE I
The Timing of Preference Formation and Labor Supply
taste parameters are determined during an agent’s childhood as
a result of her parent’s child-rearing effort (i.e., investment in
preferences). Once an agent reaches adulthood, preferences no
longer change. An adult therefore takes her own preferences as
given, but gets to shape her child’s tastes.
Agents are altruistic toward their children. In addition, their
utility depends on consumption, leisure, and investment in prefer-
ences in each of the two adult periods (see the time line in Figure I).
More formally, a young adult’s lifetime utility is given by
(1 − B)(log(c1) + A(1 − n1) − lA,1 − lB,1)
+ B(log(c2) + A(1 − n2) − lA,2 − lB,2)
+ z Vchild(A′(lA, A), B′(lB, B)).(1)
Here A denotes the taste for leisure, and B denotes patience.
The earlier terms of (1) are the adult’s felicity: c1 and c2 denote
consumption, n1 and n2 labor supply, and lA,1, lA,2, lB,1, and lB,2 the
effort choices for investing in the child’s taste for leisure and pa-
tience. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the investments
in preferences are only productive if sustained at the same level
over the two adult periods. Thus, lA,1 = lA,2 = lA and lB,1 = lB,2 =
lB. The third row of (1) is the altruistic component: Vchild repre-
sents the child’s maximized utility as a function of its preference
parameters, as chosen by the parent. A′(lA, A) and B′(lB, B) are the
“production functions” for the child’s preferences, which take the
forms
A′(lA, A) = ψ A¯+ (1 − ψ)A+ g(lA),(2)
B′(lB, B) = ψ B¯+ (1 − ψ)B+ f (lB),(3)
where ψ ∈ (0,1] is a constant depreciation rate and f and g are
nonnegative increasing functions. A¯ > 0 and B¯ > 0 represent
the innate levels of the taste for leisure and patience, that is,
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the steady states of A and B in the absence of any investment.
The intergenerational persistence of preferences captures the
notion that, to some extent, children learn by imitating parental
attitudes. Thus, part of the parents’ preferences are transmitted
effortlessly to the child. The parental effort is bounded: lA ∈ [0, l¯A]
and lB ∈ [0, l¯B]. Also, we normalize the time endowment to unity,
n1 ∈ [0,1] and n2 ∈ [0,1], and impose the following restrictions.
ASSUMPTION 1. The function f : [0, l¯B] → R+ is continuous,
strictly increasing, and weakly concave, and g : [0, l¯A] → R+
is continuous, strictly increasing, and strictly concave. More-
over, g(0) = f (0) = 0 and f (l¯B) ≤ ψ(1 − B¯). The parameters z
and ψ satisfy 0 < z < 1 and 0 < ψ < 1.
The assumptions imply the upper bounds for the preference
parameters Amax ≡ A¯+ g(l¯A)/ψ and Bmax ≡ B¯+ f (l¯B)/ψ ≤ 1.
III.B. Wage Earners
We first describe outcomes for agents who rely exclusively on
labor income. In our historical application this will correspond to
the landless classes, such as workers and artisans. In addition to
choosing labor supply and investing in preferences, these agents
choose an occupation. An occupation i is characterized by a wage
(or labor productivity) profile {w1,i, w2,i}, where w1,i and w2,i are
strictly positive and w2,i ≥ w1,i, due to a premium to experience
and human capital. There is a finite number I of occupations
to choose from. Occupations are indexed by i ∈ {1,2, . . . , I} and
ordered according to the steepness of the wage profile. Without
loss of generality, we ignore occupations featuring a dominated
profile.
ASSUMPTION 2. The productivity profiles satisfy w2,i ≥ w1,i > 0 for
all i. Moreover, a higher index denotes a steeper productivity
profile; that is, j > i implies w1, j < w1,i and w2, j > w2,i.
Because parents are altruistic toward their children and pref-
erences are time-consistent, the decision problem can be given a
dynastic interpretation, where the head of the dynasty makes de-
cisions for all subsequent generations.9 In this section, we analyze
9. Note that discounting across generations is not a choice variable and de-
pends on the exogenous altruism parameter z. It could be argued that investments
in patience also affect altruism (i.e., z may be endogenous). Such a model would
lead to qualitatively similar results, but the change would come at the cost of a
loss of analytical tractability.
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the problem in partial equilibrium, taking the productivity pro-
files {w1,i, w2,i} as exogenous and time-invariant. In Section IV, we
will extend the analysis to a general-equilibrium economy where
the wage profiles are endogenously determined.
The development of financial markets plays an important role
in our analysis. For now, we assume that financial markets are
absent, that is, households cannot borrow or lend to smooth out
consumption. Hence, consumption is equal to income in each pe-
riod, c1 = w1,in1 and c2 = w2,in2, and the preference parameters A
and B are the only state variables for a dynasty. Later on, we will
discuss the effects of financial development.
A young adult’s choice problem can be represented by the
Bellman equation
V (A, B) = max
i∈I,lA,lB,n1,n2
{(1 − B)(log(w1,in1) + A(1 − n1))
+ B(log(w2,in2) + A(1 − n2)) − lA − lB + z V (A′, B′)}(4)
subject to (2) and (3). Our decision problem is a dynamic pro-
gramming problem with two state variables on the compact state
space [A¯, Amax] × [B¯, Bmax]. Standard recursive arguments imply
that the Bellman equation (4) has a unique solution. Because A is
constant over an individual’s life, the optimal choice of labor sup-
ply in (4) is constant as well; that is, n1 = n2 = n. This observation
leads to a useful result: the problems of investing in patience and
in the taste for leisure are separable.
LEMMA 1. The value function V is additively separable in its ar-
guments, V (A, B) = vA(A) + vB(B), where
vA(A) = max
lA,n
{log(n) + A(1 − n) − lA + zvA(A′)},(5)
vB(B) = max
i∈I,lB
{(1 − B) log(w1,i)
+B log(w2,i) − lB + zvB(B′)},(6)
subject to, respectively, (2) and (3).
Lemma 1 implies that as long as wages are the only source of
income, the occupational choice does not interact with the invest-
ment in the taste for leisure, so that we can analyze the problems
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of investing in patience and in the taste for leisure separately.10
We start by characterizing the value function vB(B), which reflects
both the investment in patience and the choice of an occupation.
The policy function for the investment in patience is denoted
lB(B).
PROPOSITION 1. The value function vB is nondecreasing, convex,
and piecewise linear. The steepness of the optimal wage pro-
file, w2,i/w1,i, is nondecreasing in B, and the optimal invest-
ment in patience, lB = lB (B), is nondecreasing in B. Over the
interior of any interval for B on which vB is linear, the occu-
pational choice of each member of the dynasty (i.e., parent,
child, grandchild, and so on) is constant and unique (though
possibly different across generations), and lB(B) is constant
and generically single-valued. Each kink in the value func-
tion corresponds to a switch to an occupation with a steeper
income profile by a present or future member of the dynasty.
At a kink, the optimal choices of occupation and lB correspond-
ing to both adjoining intervals are optimal. Thus, the optimal
policy function is a nondecreasing step function, which takes
multiple values only at a step.
The value and policy functions are visualized in Figure II.
That vB is nondecreasing follows from the assumption that the
wage profile is nondecreasing. In particular, if for sufficiently low
patience all members of a dynasty choose an occupation with a
flat income profile (w1 = w2), the value function is constant in
that range. This corresponds to the interval [B¯, B1] in Figure II.
Within this range, the value function is flat (upper panel), and
agents do not invest in patience (lower panel). As soon as B is suf-
ficiently large (B > B1), a current or future member of the dynasty
finds choosing a profession with w2 > w1 optimal, and the value
function becomes strictly increasing in B.
The convexity of vB follows from a complementarity between
patience and the choice of steep income profiles. To gain intuition,
consider first the decision problemwithout an occupational choice,
that is, with a fixed occupation {w1, w2}. If we vary the initial
generation’s B while holding the investment choice lB constant
10. The additive separability of the value function hinges on logarithmic
utility. Because logarithmic utility is a common assumption in problems with
endogenous labor supply, our analysis provides a useful tractable benchmark. The
solution can be characterized under more general preferences if one abstracts from
investment in the taste for leisure; see Doepke and Zilibotti (2005).
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FIGURE II
The Value Function for Patience vB (B) and Policy Function lB (B) for Investing
in Patience
over all generations, utility is a linear function of B (as depicted
by the dotted line in the upper panel of Figure II). Moreover,
given the fixed income profile, choosing a constant lB is optimal:
the marginal return to investing in patience in a given period is
given by z log(w2/w1), which does not depend on B. Generalizing
from this observation, the value function is linear over any range
of B such that it is optimal for the current and future members
of a dynasty to hold the occupational choice constant. In general,
however, occupational choices are not fixed. Given that B is the
relative weight on utility late in life, it is optimal to choose an
occupation with a steep wage profile (large i) when B is high, and
one yielding a flat profile when B is low. As we increase B, the
slope of the value function increases discretely every time either
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a current or a future member of the dynasty finds switching into
a profession with a steeper profile optimal, resulting in a convex
value function.
In the upper panel of Figure II, the true value function is
represented by the solid line; the points B1 and B2 are thresholds
where either the current or a future occupation changes. At each
of the kinks, some member of the dynasty is indifferent between
(at least) two different profiles. As depicted in the lower panel
of Figure II, the optimal lB increases at each step because the
marginal benefit of being patient increases with the steepness of
the wage profile. Because the choice of lB depends on the chosen
income profile, there may be multiple optimal choices of lB at a B
where the value function has a kink, whereas in between kinks
the optimal choice of lB is unique.
Proposition 1 allows us to characterize the equilibrium law
of motion for patience. Because the policy correspondence lB (B) is
monotone, the dynamics of B is also monotone and converges to a
steady state from any initial condition.11
PROPOSITION 2. The law of motion of patience capital is described
by the difference equation
B′ = ψ B¯+ (1 − ψ) B+ f (lB (B)) ,
where lB(B) is a nondecreasing step function (as described in
Proposition 1). Generically, for any initial condition B0, the
dynasty converges to a steady state with constant B where
parents and children choose the same profession. The steady-
state levels of B and lB are increasing in the steepness of
the steady-state income profile. Multiple steady states are
possible.
Because B converges to a steady state, there must be a time
T such that the occupational choice of all members of a dynasty
is constant from T onward. The dynamics of B is particularly
simple once the occupational choice is constant. Because the law
of motion is given by B′ = ψ B¯+ (1 − ψ)Bt + f (lssB ), patience con-
verges to a steady state given by Bss = B¯+ f (lssB )/ψ . However, the
11. If the production function for patience f (lB) is linear, in knife-edge
economies (i.e., in a zero-measure subset of the parameter space), the policy cor-
respondence is not single-valued even between steps. Convergence in terms of
occupational choice is still guaranteed, but dynasties may be indifferent between
multiple patience levels. In generic economies, lB(B) is single-valued even in the
linear case.
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steady state does not have to be unique, even for a given B0. For
example, if the initial generation is indifferent between two dif-
ferent occupations, the steady state can depend on which one is
chosen.
So far, we have established that members of different profes-
sions face different incentives for investing in patience, provided
that the steepness of income profiles differs across professions. A
key assumption underlying this result is that access to financial
markets is limited. The incentive to invest in patience is deter-
mined not by the income profile per se, but by the lifetime profile
of period-by-period utilities. If agents were able to borrow and
lend within each cohort at a fixed interest rate, the interaction
of patience and occupational choices would be severed: first, only
occupations maximizing the present value of the lifetime wage
profile would be chosen in equilibrium; second, since the house-
hold could freely allocate income between the two adult periods,
the choice of a profession would have no bearing on the incen-
tives to invest in patience. Put differently, at least some financial
market imperfections are necessary for occupational choice and
investments in patience to be interlinked.12
A positive implication of this finding is that the degree of
preference heterogeneity in a population depends on the develop-
ment of financial markets. In an economywhere financial markets
are mostly absent, incentives to invest in patience vary widely
across members of different professions, and consequently we
would expect to observe a large corresponding variation in ac-
tual acquired preferences. These differences should be smaller in
modern economies with less imperfect financial markets.13
Consider next the problem of investing in the taste for leisure,
as described by the maximization problem (5). The following
proposition characterizes the value and policy functions vA(A) and
lA(A).
12. It is not necessary, however, to assume the complete absence of financial
markets, as we do for analytical convenience. As long as the steepness of an income
profile is at least partially transmitted to utility profiles, the basic mechanism is
at work. The assumption of complete financial markets is routinely rejected even
in contemporary data from industrial economies; see, for example, Card, Chetty,
and Weber (2007).
13. For example, although engaging in a lengthy program of study (such as
medical school) that leads to high future incomes may still require some patience
and perseverance, today’s students have access to educational loans and credit
cards. Hence, modern-day artisans are able to consume some of their future re-
wards already in the present, and consequently they (and their parents) face a
smaller incentive to invest in specialized preferences.
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PROPOSITION 3. The value function vA is nondecreasing and
convex. Optimal labor supply is given by
(7) n = min{A−1,1}.
The optimal investment in taste for leisure, lA = lA(A), is
nondecreasing in A.
More specifically, the value function is strictly increasing over
any range of A where leisure is positive, that is, n < 1 or, given
(7), A > 1. The convexity of the value function is once again due to
a complementarity between preferences and economic decisions
befitting these preferences. The value function would be linear in
A if people could not adjust their labor supply when A changed.
However, people do adjust n (they work less when A increases),
and the value function is thus convex. Unlike the choice of an
occupation, n is a continuous variable, implying that the value
function is strictly convex, except in ranges where n is at a corner.
The characterization of vA leads to the following results regarding
the equilibrium law of motion.
PROPOSITION 4. The law of motion of the taste for leisure is de-
scribed by the following difference equation:
A′ = ψ A¯+ (1 − ψ)A+ g(lA(A)).
Given an initial condition A0, the dynasty converges mono-
tonically to a steady state with constant A.
Multiple steady states are possible, depending on the param-
eterization of g. However, cross-dynasty differences in the taste
for leisure can only arise from differences in initial conditions. If
all dynasties start with the same A, they remain identical along
this preference dimension. The incentive to invest into the taste
for leisure depends entirely on the amount of leisure enjoyed by
future members of the dynasty.
III.C. Rentiers
We now consider the choice problem for agents earning rents.
In our historical analysis, this will correspond to the landowners.
Unlike the landless wage earners, the landowners in our econ-
omy will not have to choose an occupation, because their income
is provided by inherited land. However, they still have to make
decisions on patience and the taste for leisure.
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We denote the rent accruing per unit of land by r, and the
amount of land owned by a given landowner by x. In order to ap-
propriate the entire rent, landowners have to monitor the workers
on their land. The landowners’ budget constraints are
c1 = rx + (r − r) xn1 and c2 = rx + (r − r) xn2,
where n1 and n2 denote the monitoring effort (in units of time)
in the two periods. Even without monitoring (the proverbial “ab-
sent landlord”), the landowner earns a minimum return r < r on
the land. By setting n = 1, landowners can appropriate the en-
tire rent. Enjoying leisure entails a linear income loss. The return
to monitoring is a reduced-form representation of moral hazard
problems, such as the possibility that administrators steal a part
of the rent. The key feature of this income process is that total
income is less elastic with respect to labor effort than the income
of pure wage earners.
Because the income profile is flat, optimal labor supply is
constant, and the value function is independent of B. Thus,
landowners do not invest in patience, and their investment and
labor supply problem can be written as
V L(A, B) = vLA(A)
= max
lA,n
{
(log(rx + (r − r)xn) + A(1 − n)) − lA + zvLA(A′)
}
,(8)
subject to (2).
PROPOSITION 5. The value function vLA is nondecreasing and
convex. Optimal labor supply is given by
(9) n = max
{
min
{
A−1 − r
r − r ,1
}
,0
}
.
The optimal investment in taste for leisure, lA = lLA(A), is
nondecreasing in A. Given an initial condition A0, the dynasty
converges monotonically to a steady state with constant A,
which is higher than the steady-state A for pure wage earn-
ers (as described in Proposition 4).
These results are parallel to Propositions 3 and 4 except that
for a given A, labor supply is lower than in the case of pure wage
income and decreasing in the ratio of the pure rent to the return
to effort. This feeds back into the investment decision: parents
whose children have more time for leisure invest more in the
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children’s taste for leisure. Note that the incentives for landown-
ers to supply labor and invest in the taste for leisure do not depend
on the size of their estate, x: in steady state the entire class of
landowners will have identical preferences. Over time, landown-
ing dynasties earning rents will develop a higher taste for leisure
(i.e., a lower work ethic) than dynasties relying on labor income
only.
IV. PREFERENCE FORMATION AND THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION
In this section, we apply our theory to the evolution of
preferences across social classes before and after the Industrial
Revolution. As a first step, we embed our theory of preference
formation into a general-equilibrium model of a preindustrial
economy. We show that even if everyone initially has the same
preferences, general-equilibrium forces can lead to a stratifica-
tion of society and divergence of preferences across social classes.
Then we explore how the economy evolves once the Industrial
Revolution arrives in the form of new opportunities for invest-
ment and entrepreneurship.
IV.A. The Preindustrial Equilibrium
In the analysis of the previous section, the level of income de-
rived in each profession has been taken as exogenous. We now en-
dogenize wages and rental rates by constructing a simple general-
equilibrium model of a preindustrial economy characterized by
two modes of production: agriculture and artisanship. Agricul-
tural output, YF , and the artisans’ production, YM, are perfect
substitutes, so that total output is given by Y = YF + YM. The two
technologies differ in terms of the inputs used. The agricultural
technology uses unskilled labor L and land Z and is described by
the production function
YF = Lα Z1−α,(10)
where α ∈ (0,1). The artisan technology is linear in skilled labor
H:
YM = qH,(11)
where q is a productivity parameter. Both sectors are competitive,
so that factors are paid their marginal product. The total amount
of land is fixed at Z = 1. Land is not traded and is owned by a
fixed measure of dynasties, each of which owns an equal share
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x of land. The rents accruing to landowners depend on x and on
their monitoring effort, as discussed in the previous section. Each
landowner bequeaths the land he owns to his child when he passes
away. There is no occupational mobility between landowners and
the other classes. The mass of landless labor-market participants
(workers and artisans) is equal to one in every period.
Themain difference between skilled and unskilled labor is the
lifetime income profile. Recall that at equilibrium, all individuals
relying only on labor income supply the same amount of labor n in
both periods of their lives. An unskilled worker is equally efficient
in youth and in old age, and therefore supplies an equal number n
of efficiency units of unskilled labor in both adult periods. Skilled
workers (i.e., artisans), in contrast, use some of the young adult
period to acquire skills and experience. Their effective labor sup-
ply is given by n efficiency units of skilled labor in the first adult
period and by γ n units in the second adult period, where γ > 1.
Hence, artisans have a steep lifetime income profile, whereas the
workers’ profile is flat.
Suppose that initially the productivity q of artisanship is so
low that only the agricultural technology is used. As a conse-
quence, all landless agents are workers with flat income profiles.
Patience is not a valuable asset in such an economy and remains
at the natural level B¯. At this stage, all landless agents have the
same preferences. Now consider the transition of the economy
once the productivity of artisanship q increases unexpectedly. If
the increase is sufficiently large, having all workers remain in
agriculture is no longer an equilibrium. Thus, wages will adjust
in general equilibrium to make everyone just indifferent between
being a worker and being an artisan, and adults will endogenously
divide between the two occupations.
Once the initial sorting of the landless agents into workers
and artisans has taken place, stratification in preferences across
social classes necessarily follows. In general, the transition can
be complicated if the fractions of workers and artisans (and hence
wages) change over time. Here we focus on equilibria such that, af-
ter the initial sorting, the number of workers and artisans remains
constant and the wages are time-invariant.14 More formally, let µ
be the aggregate labor supply in agriculture (that is, the fraction
14. This focus is consistent with the observation that factor prices varied
little in the preindustrial economy. Clark (2007, Figure 9.4) shows that the wage
of craftsmen relative to laborers in Britain were about constant between 1400 and
1800. During the same period, land rents were a roughly constant share of income
(Clark 2007, Figure 7.4).
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of workers among the landless adults multiplied by individual
labor supply) after the sorting. Workers then earn a wage equal
to wF = αµα−1 in both periods, whereas artisans earn q in the
first and γq in the second period. If wF is constant over time, the
analysis of the preceding section applies directly to the decision
problem in the general-equilibrium economy.15
Themain feature of this equilibrium is that occupational sort-
ing triggers divergence in patience across worker and artisan dy-
nasties, even though in the first generation everyone has the same
preferences. Given their steep income profiles, from the second
generation onward all members of the artisan dynasties are more
patient thanworkers and strictly prefer to be artisans. In contrast,
the taste for leisure is not affected by the occupational choice, be-
cause themembers of both occupations continue to rely exclusively
on labor income. Thus, the theory predicts no sorting across work-
ers and artisans along this dimension of preferences, and both
groups continue to work the same number of hours.16 Land rents
are constant at equilibrium, so that landowners have a flat income
profile and do not invest in patience. However, landowners invest
more than artisans and workers in the taste for leisure, implying
that their taste for leisure converges to a higher steady state.
To summarize, the members of the three occupations in
our preindustrial economy all end up with different preferences,
shaped in each case by the economic conditions characterizing the
profession. Both workers and artisans are hardworking because
they rely exclusively on labor income. Artisans are more patient
than workers, however, because they face a steep lifetime income
profile. The landowners face an income profile that is as flat as
that of the workers, and they consequently have the same low
patience. Unlike the workers, the landowners derive their income
mostly from land instead of labor. As a consequence, the landown-
ers develop a greater taste for leisure (or conversely a greater
aversion to work) than the landless classes. In the preindustrial
economy, this stratification of preferences is only important to the
extent that it determines occupational choices. We now examine
how the fate of the different classes evolves when technological
change alters the economic landscape.
15. An equilibrium with constant wages only exists for a subset of the admis-
sible parameter set. A set of sufficient conditions is provided in the online technical
appendix.
16. This is consistent with the evidence presented by Voth (2000), who doc-
uments that the numbers of hours worked by workers and artisans in the prein-
dustrial era were approximately the same. See also the discussion in Section V.
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IV.B. From Artisan to Capitalist
We model industrialization by introducing a new technology
that increases the productivity of savings and investments. The
new technology unexpectedly becomes available after preferences
have already diverged across classes. The class-specific prefer-
ences, which were formed in response to the economic conditions
of the preindustrial period, also turn out to determine the ex-
tent to which members of different classes make use of the new
technology. The basic result is unsurprising in the light of stan-
dard economic theory: themost patient and hardest-working class,
that is, the artisans, are the first to take advantage of the new
opportunity—they possess the “spirit of capitalism.” The artisans
leapfrog over the landowning class and replace them as the eco-
nomic elite. However, preferences continue to evolve after the in-
troduction of the new technology. To some extent, this process can
mitigate the subsequent divergence of wealth across classes. In
particular, as the new industrialists accumulate wealth, they also
start accumulating a taste for leisure. As a result, the children
and grandchildren of the first industrialists are less economically
successful than the founding generation.
After the introduction of the new technology, each dynasty
faces a decision problem with three state variables: leisure taste
A, patience B, and capital K. We interpret the capital variable
as a family-owned enterprise. Young adults decide how much of
their first-period income to consume and how much to invest into
the family business. Investments in the business are assumed to
be irreversible: agents can consume the output of the investment
technology (as well as their labor and land-rent income), but the
capital stock itself cannot be liquidated and turned into consump-
tion. The capital owned by an old agent is bequeathed—up to
depreciation—to her child.17 We continue to assume that agents
cannot borrow.
The capital stock of the family business depreciates at the
rate δ. The rate of return on capital depends on labor effort and
17. Dynastic enterprises were common in the early days of the Industrial
Revolution. Caselli and Gennaioli (2003) link this observation to the underde-
velopment of financial markets: it was unprofitable for parents to liquidate their
business instead of leaving it to the children. In our model, the irreversibility
constraint implies that differences in investment across families lead to different
initial assets for the next generation. Under reversible investment, similar results
could be obtained if the altruism parameter z (the intergenerational discount
factor) was an increasing function of patience B (the intragenerational discount
factor).
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is denoted by R(n). Here the return is increasing in n; that is, a
hardworking entrepreneur earns a higher return than a passive
owner. This captures the role of managerial effort and monitoring
in a business and is parallel to our treatment of rental income
from land. The return is given by
R(n) = R + (R − R)nη,
where R > R > 0 and 0 < η < 1.18 We also assume that the busi-
ness activity is run in addition to one of the existing professions.
Thus, a young entrepreneur can derive additional labor income as
a worker or artisan, or in the case of landowners, entrepreneur-
ship can be combined with rental income from land. This feature,
together with the absence of any fixed cost, allows businesses to
be started at a small scale on top of other activities. In particular,
we want to allow aristocrats to earn rents from their land and in-
vest the proceeds in a capital market, in order not to exclude them
from investment from the outset. For simplicity, we assume that
a single effort choice determines labor or rental income as well as
the return on the family business (separating these choice vari-
ables would complicate the notation without changing the main
results).
Let K ≥ 0 denote the bequest of capital received by a young
adult. The budget constraints and the irreversibility constraint
are given by
c1 + K′ = (1 − δ + R(n1,i))K + y1,(12)
c2 = R(n2,i)K′ + y2,(13)
K′ ≥ (1 − δ) K.(14)
Here y1 and y2 denote income derived outside the family busi-
ness. For workers and artisans, this consists of labor income
(y1 = w1,in1,i and y2 = w2,in2,i), whereas aristocrats receive the
rents from their land x as a function of their monitoring effort
(y1 = rx + (r − r) xn1 and y2 = rx + (r − r) xn2). In the budget con-
straint (12) for the first adult period, total income consists of y1
plus capital income (1 − δ + R(n1,i))K. Because of the irreversibil-
ity constraint (14), consumption cannot exceed the sum of cur-
rent output and labor income: c1 ≤ R(n1,i)K. In the second-period
18. The curvature in the return function is not essential for the results but
is useful to generate a smooth relationship between state variables and the en-
trepreneurial return in the simulations below.
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budget constraint (13), the agent earns y2 plus capital income
R(n2,i)K′. Because the capital stock cannot be liquidated, the agent
bequeaths the remaining capital (1 − δ)K′ to her child.19
The recursive representation of the decision problem of a
young adult with leisure preference A, patience B, and inherited
capital stock K is given by the following Bellman equation:
V (A, B, K) = max
c1,c2,lA,lB,n1,n2
{(1 − B)(log(c1) + A(1 − n1)) + B(log(c2)
+ A(1 − n2)) − lA − lB + z V (A′, B′, (1 − δ)K′)},
where the maximization is subject to the laws of motion for A
and B, (2) and (3), and the budget and irreversibility constraints,
(12), (13), and (14). Moreover, the choice variables are bounded by
c1 ≥ 0, c2 ≥ 0, 0 ≤ n1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ n2 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ lA ≤ l¯A, and 0 ≤ lB ≤ l¯B.
Capital investment affects the incentives for investing in both
preference parameters, implying that the separation result of
Lemma 1 no longer holds and the equilibrium laws of motion
of A, B, and K are interdependent. This prevents a full analyti-
cal characterization, and the model must be solved numerically.
Nevertheless, the basic tradeoffs that determine investment in
preferences are still the same, so that, at least qualitatively, the
interaction of capital accumulation and preference formation is
easily understood.
First, consider how preferences determine the investment
choice. Here a standard Euler equation applies: a young adult in-
vests if future marginal utilities weighted by the appropriate time
discount factors and investment returns exceed the cost of invest-
ing, that is, current marginal utility. Thus, more patient agents
have a higher propensity to invest. In addition, agents with a low
taste for leisure also tend to invest more, since by working harder
they earn a higher return on their investment. If we apply these
findings to our economic environment, it follows that the artisans
are, at least initially, the ideal investors, because they are both
patient and hard-working. The other classes either invest less
(relative to their income) or do not invest at all. The latter would
19. In principle, parents could bequeath additional resources to their off-
spring. However, we focus on economies where the irreversibility of the capital
stock is a binding constraint for the old adults. Namely, in the last period of their
lives agents would like to liquidate part of the capital stock and consume it, but
they are instead forced to leave it to their children as an involuntary bequest.
Agents clearly do not leave any additional bequests in such economies. Formally,
this outcome can be guaranteed by choosing the altruism factor z appropriately.
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occur if an agent preferred to borrow rather than save at the rate
of return provided by the investment technology.
Once a family has entered entrepreneurship, this will feed
back into the further evolution of preferences within the dynasty.
Here the interactions with leisure preferences and patience are
opposites. In the case of patience, the fact that a dynasty starts
investing will increase the investment in patience, which ampli-
fies the original drive to invest. The reason is that investment
endogenously steepens utility profiles both within and across gen-
erations; that is, utility drops during the early investment period
and increases in the later return periods.
However, this effect will be mitigated or even reversed by the
endogeneity of the taste for leisure. The optimality conditions for
labor supply and investment in leisure are unchanged; thus, labor
supply depends on leisure preference as well as the elasticity of
consumption with respect to labor effort, and investment in the
taste for leisure depends on future labor effort. Initially, an artisan
or worker dynasty entering entrepreneurship has little apprecia-
tion for leisure and is therefore hardworking, as historically these
dynasties relied on labor income alone. However, the descendants
of the initial entrepreneurs inherit the family firm. Thus, just like
the landowners’, their consumption derives increasingly from cap-
ital income and becomes less elastic with respect to labor effort. As
a consequence, the founders’ children and grandchildren work less
hard than their forefathers and develop the same fine tastes for
leisure that the landowning class already possesses. Of course, the
drop in labor effort also lowers the return on investment, which
can lead to a slowdown or even reversal in accumulation. Thus,
the model verifies the “Carnegie conjecture”: the initial success of
a dynasty can lay the seed for its ultimate downfall. Whether this
effect dominates the increased accumulation of patience depends
on parameters. This “Buddenbrooks” effect will be particularly
strong if investment in the taste for leisure is highly elastic and
labor effort has a large effect on entrepreneurial success, that is,
R − R is large.
We now provide a numerical illustration of the equilibrium
dynamics of our model after the introduction of a capitalist tech-
nology. Table I summarizes the parameter values used for the
simulation. The functional forms for investing in the taste for
leisure and patience are given by g(lA) = φAlξAA and g(lB) = φBlξBB .
As described in Section IV, the economy starts out under uniform
preferences in the preindustrial period long before the capitalist
772 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
TABLE I
PARAMETER VALUES FOR SIMULATED ECONOMY
Parameter Interpretation Value
z Intergenerational altruism 0.5
A¯ Natural taste for leisure 1.0
φA Level parameter for taste for leisure 1.5
ξA Curvature parameter for taste for leisure 0.5
B¯ Natural patience 0.4
φB Level parameter for patience 0.66
ξB Curvature parameter for patience 0.5
ψ Depreciation of preferences 0.5
γ Steepness of artisan income profile 2.0
R Minimum return of capitalist technology 0.35
R Maximum return of capitalist technology 0.42
η Elasticity of entrepreneurial return 0.5
δ Depreciation of capital 0.2
technology becomes available. Then people sort into professions,
and over time, preferences approach occupation-specific steady
states. In the preindustrial steady state, artisans earn a wage of
1.0 in the first and 2.0 in the second period, whereas workers earn
a wage of w ≈ 1.4 in each period.
Figure III displays the dynamics of capital and patience for
members of the three occupations. The economy is still in the
preindustrial steady state in period 0; in period 1, the capitalist
technology is introduced unexpectedly. Given the return of the
investment technology, the workers continue not to invest in pa-
tience. The artisans, however, are sufficiently patient to find in-
vestment in capital attractive right away. Investment in capital
increases the incentive for investing in patience, so that both the
artisans’ patience and their growth rate of capital increase for a
few periods.
Figure IV displays the dynamics of the taste for leisure during
this transition. Once again, for the workers nothing changes. In
contrast, as the artisan-turned-capitalist dynasties grow richer,
their work ethic deteriorates. After a few periods, their taste for
leisure is just as refined as that of the landowners. This con-
tributes to a slowdown in their capital accumulation.
Given that the workers do not invest, the landowners a for-
tiori do not do so either. They have the same flat income profile
(although possibly a higher income level) and the same low pa-
tience as the workers but additionally a higher appreciation for
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leisure. They therefore continue to live off their land rents and are
soon overtaken by the rising class of capitalists as the economi-
cally dominant group in society.20
An interesting feature of themodel is that the same pattern of
catch-up and overtaking can also be generated in an environment
where the investment technology is available from the outset,
instead of being introduced later on. If all dynasties start out
sufficiently impatient, initially the investment technology is not
used. Some dynasties, however, sort into artisanship, and start
to accumulate patience. After a few generations, the patience of
the artisans reaches a critical level, at which they start to use the
investment technology and turn into capitalists. In this version of
the model, it is not the surprise appearance of a new technology,
but the endogenous accumulation of patience capital that triggers
the Industrial Revolution. Arguably, this sequence of events is
closer in spirit to Weber’s original hypothesis.
The outcome displayed in Figures III and IV is extreme in
that two classes choose to exclude themselves entirely from en-
trepreneurship, implying that wealth inequality grows indefi-
nitely. Other long-run patterns are possible, depending on the
parameters of the production function. The robust prediction of
the theory is that the most patient and hardworking groups are
the first to make use of a new investment opportunity. Even if
the environment were such that ultimately even landowners in-
vested, it would be the middle class that would get a head start
and possibly overtake the landowning class in the process.
V. HISTORICAL EVIDENCE
In this section we document the basic historical facts under-
lying our theory, starting with the social origin of the first indus-
trialists. In a study of founders of large industrial undertakings
in Britain between 1750 and 1850, Crouzet (1985, p. 68) concludes
that “neither the upper class nor the lower orders made a large
contribution to the recruitment of industrialists.” The only class
that was significantly overrepresented among the industrialists
20. In the model, all landowners are identical so that there is not a single
landowning investor. The separation of classes is less sharp if one adds preference
shocks to the model. Then a few patient landowners can emerge who decide to
utilize the new accumulation opportunity. These landowners would become quite
rich, since they can earn income from both industry and agriculture.
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was themiddle class.21 Similarly, Jeremy (1990, p. 347) documents
that in a sample of founders of large British businesses, among
those born before 1870, the majority had “left school in their mid-
teens or earlier and then started to learn a trade, most frequently
by an apprenticeship.” The minor involvement of landowners not
only in the establishment, but also in the financing of new enter-
prises is surprising, given the extreme concentration of wealth in
the hands of the landowning elite at the time. As late as 1880,
fewer than 5,000 landowners still owned more than 50% of all
land (Cannadine [1990]; see also Lindert [1981, p. 378]). Com-
menting on the underrepresentation of the elite, Crouzet (1985, p.
70) writes, “The contribution of that class to the industrial leader-
ship is not proportionate to its large share in the nation’s capital
and income. Eric Richard has rightly asked of the great landed
families: ‘Why did they not do a great deal more in the Industrial
Revolution? After all, no class was better placed to benefit from
the transformation of the economy.’ ”
Even the already low estimate of the share of peers and
gentry among the industrialists overstates their true involvement
in entrepreneurial activities. Landowners often became involved
simply by virtue of owning the land on which an industrial
activity was to take place. In the majority of these cases, the
aristocrats had no active entrepreneurial role. “If they owned
blast-furnaces, forges and other establishments, they tended
to lease them to tenants rather than to operate them through
salaried managers . . . [They] were rather passive lessors and
investors than active business leaders” (Rubinstein 1981, p. 68).
Some became involved in the textile industries, but even those
“were content to build—or help to build—mills and to lease
them out” (Rubinstein 1981, p. 74). Similarly, those who became
involved in the construction of mines and railways on their land
usually insisted on receiving regular periodical payments over
the sums invested, without any commitment to financing the
growth of the enterprises. From the 1880s, increasing numbers of
21. In the sample analyzed in this study, only 2.3% of the industrialists came
from the peerage and gentry (Crouzet 1985, Table 5). In contrast, 85% of the new
industrialists had a middle-class background, with almost half of them coming
from low-middle-class families, such as “shopkeepers, self-employed craftsmen
and artisans, cultivators of various kinds” (Crouzet 1985, p. 127). Although the
upper class was a small group to begin with, the representation of the middle
class was higher than that of the upper class even as a proportion of their share
in the population. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, peerage and gentry
accounted for about 1.4% of the population, whereas the middle class made up
slightly less than 30%.
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aristocrats became board members of public companies. However,
this step was taken only by the poorer members of the upper
class. “Apart from Rothschild and Glenconner, all landowners who
were company directors were indeed impoverished” (Cannadine
1990, p. 406–409).
The new class of industrialists progressively replaced the
landed elite as the economically dominant group in society, as
reflected, with some lag, in the wealth distribution. In the first
half of the nineteenth century, large fortunes were still by and
large associated with land ownership. Rubinstein (1981) reports
that among the 189 individuals who died between 1809 and 1858
with a fortune exceeding one million pounds, 95% were wealthy
landowners. However, merchants and industrial capitalists were
already catching up. Lindert (1986, Table 1) documents that in
1810 the average estate of living gentlemen was more than three
times larger than that of merchants and industrial capitalists,
whereas in 1875 it was 16% smaller. Soon thereafter, landown-
ers no longer featured prominently among the wealthiest families
in the country. Between 1900 and 1939, only 7% of the 273 in-
dividuals who died as millionaires belonged to the landed elite
(Rubinstein 1981, Tables 3.2–3.4). Among the nonlanded million-
aires, about half of the new fortunes were generated in the manu-
facturing sector, with most of the rest accounted for by commerce
and finance. The old elite managed to preserve a significant social
and economic influence, partly through intermarriage with the
new industrial dynasties.22 Yet the monopoly of political and eco-
nomic power that this small elite had enjoyed for centuries was
never to be restored.
Our theory attributes this transformation to class-specific
preferences, which, in turn, were shaped by the economic con-
ditions in the preindustrial period. Artisans and craftsmen,
the typical professions of the preindustrial middle class, were
required to make large human capital investments and conse-
quently had steep lifetime income profiles. In most of Europe, an
artisan’s career advanced through three stages: apprenticeship,
22. Clark (2007, ch. 15) documents the story of the Sassoon family, whose
foundingmember, David Sassoon, was a Sephardic Jewmerchant born in Baghdad
in 1792. By the 1880s the family had established several global enterprises and
invested in India and China, and by the 1920s it owned more than one-tenth of
the Bombay cotton industry. Several members of the family moved to England and
were absorbed into the English aristocracy throughmarriages. See also Cannadine
(1990, p. 347).
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journeymanship, and mastership.23 Apprenticeship would on
average take five to six years, but in some professions one would
remain an apprentice for up to 12 years (Epstein 1991). After
apprenticeship, artisans would become journeymen and travel
around European cities, serving as employees at some master’s
shop. This wandering period would last for a minimum of three to
four years (Friedrichs 1995). Savings and frugality were essential
for journeymen who hoped to become masters one day. “Unless
he was able to count on substantial inheritance or fortunate
marriage, a journeyman’s primary interest was to amass capital
for opening their shop or business” (Epstein 1991, p. 115). Having
completed his time on the road, the journeyman could apply
for admission to mastership, which was in itself an expensive
process.24 Only at that point, if successful, could the journeyman
become a master and a new guild member and open a shop at his
own expense.
In contrast, the age-earnings profiles of agricultural workers
and landowners were relatively flat. Burnette (2006) documents
that the wages of English farm workers in the early nineteenth
century varied little between the ages of 20 and 60. The landed
gentry derived its income mostly from owning land and, to a
smaller extent, from mining projects (Beckett 1986). Annual vari-
ation in a landowner’s income stems from two dominant sources:
fluctuation in land rental rates and changes in the size of the es-
tate through land sales or purchases. Although there were always
some economically successful families who were able to increase
the size of their holdings, most aristocratic landowners merely
aspired to preserve the estate, so as ultimately to pass to the
next generation just as much as they once inherited. In periods
of rising land rental rates, the income of landowners as a class
would increase as well; but given that, with few exceptions, rents
tended to change only slowly over time (at least until 1800), these
23. The life of an apprentice was not glamorous. “Upon payment of a place-
ment fee, apprentices took their place in their master’s household, agreeing to obey
and respect him as a father. . . .Not all apprentices reached mastership, but this
does not gainsay the fact that the purpose of apprenticeship was selection and the
goal a direct route to mastership” (Farr 2000, p. 33).
24. The applicants owed the payment of a series of fees, the completion of a
masterpiece according to the guild regulations, and the outlay (if the masterpiece
was accepted) for a luxurious banquet for the masters he hoped to join. In addition,
he had to submit the name of a proposed bride, whom the guild was supposed to
examine and approve. See Phelps Brown and Hopkins (1957), Farr (2000), and
Munro (2004) for additional evidence.
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movements would not generate the steep lifetime income profiles
that were typical for artisans and craftsmen.25
In our theory, differences in economic conditions ultimately
manifest themselves in class-specific preferences. And indeed, the
stark contrast of the new entrepreneurs’ thrift and work ethic
with the landed aristocracy’s free-spending habits and leisurely
lifestyle has long been part of the conventional wisdom on the
Industrial Revolution. The leisure orientation of the preindus-
trial upper class was in fact one of its defining characteristics: the
term “gentleman” traditionally signified amanwho did not need to
work. “Wealth and leisure allowed the aristocracy to develop a dis-
tinctive class culture that was reflected in the clothes they wore,
the food they ate, their manners . . . and above all in their recre-
ations” (Mate 2006, p. 279). Consistent with our theory, the aristo-
cratic devotion to leisure grew more sophisticated over time. The
social “London Season” had its origin in the sixteenth and early
seventeenth centuries and expanded to involve as many as 4,000
families in the late nineteenth century (see Cunningham [1990, p.
291]). The countryside also saw an expanding range of leisure ac-
tivities. Shooting, fox-hunting, and cricket all became fashionable
upper-class sports in the eighteenth century, whereas yachting
grew popular in the nineteenth century (see Beckett [1986, p. 236]
and Cunningham [1990, p. 292]). The available data show that the
differences in work and leisure time between the upper and lower
classes were quantitatively large. Voth (2000, Tables 3.23–3.24)
documents that in a sample of Londoners in 1760 and 1800 the in-
volvement of the elite in leisure activities was three to five times
as large as that of other social groups, whereas there were no
significant differences between the lower and the middle classes.
In contrast, the middle class developed a strict work ethic
and a growing disdain for leisure over time (Applebaum 1992).
25. Real rents per acre in England were roughly constant between 1300 and
1600. In the early seventeenth century, real rents increased sharply and then
leveled off again until 1800 (Clark 2007, Figure 14.2). In principle, a flat profile for
overall family income need not imply that individual consumption profileswere flat
as well. In particular, one might imagine that aristocrats started to consume heav-
ily only after inheriting their estates, while living frugally during their younger
years. However, the available evidence suggests that, if anything, the opposite was
true. Young aristocrats typically did not work during their childhood and young
adulthood and were supported by their parents. These family support payments
tended to be large and contributed to aristocratic indebtedness: “family payments
were not the only cause of aristocratic indebtedness, but contemporaries usually
regard them as playing a crucial role” (Beckett 1986, p. 298). Thus, aristocrats
usually lived in some comfort during their entire lives and did not experience the
stark contrast of a sober adolescence with relative prosperity during adulthood
that was typical for urban artisans and craftsmen.
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As pointed out by Weber, one source of this change was the
Protestant Reformation. Unlike in medieval Catholicism, the
glorification of God no longer required a contemplative attitude
or the praise of poverty. Rather, economic success and an aus-
tere life became a way of glorifying God. “The summum bonum
of this ethic, the earning of more money, combined with the strict
avoidance of all spontaneous enjoyment of life . . . is devoided of
any eudaemonistic . . . admixture” (Weber 1958, p. 53). Protestant
values were also closely connected to the second element of our
theory of preference formation, namely, patience or thrift.26 Max
Weber describes the effects of Puritan values on capital accumula-
tion as follows: “When the limitation of consumption is combined
with this release of acquisitive activity, the inevitable practical
result is obvious: accumulation of capital through ascetic compul-
sion to save” (Weber 1958, p. 172). Religious fervor was not, how-
ever, the only source of changing attitudes. According to Perkin
(1969), after the Restoration of 1660, secular values such as so-
cial status and prestige also became increasingly tied to wealth
accumulation and economic success. The first industrialists were
especially imbued with this new ethic of patience and hard work.
“Almost all major entrepreneurial figures took enormous risks,
worked long and hard hours, and rarely enjoyed the fruits of their
efforts until late in life” (Mokyr 1999, p. 41). Parsimony was par-
ticularly important because a large share of the new enterprises
relied on personal savings and retained earnings to grow. “The
early industrialists . . . lived very modestly, spent only a fraction of
their earnings for their households and put the rest back into the
business” (von Mises 1963, p. 622).
To some extent, the reliance on retained earnings was fea-
sible because, in most sectors, capital needs were relatively low
during the first Industrial Revolution (see Mokyr [1999, p. 96]).
However, the shortfall of savings of the wealthy upper class has
also been singled out as a contributing factor. For instance, Davis
and Gallman (2001, p. 50) write, “It may well have been true,
as Postan noted, that at least two fifteenth-century families could
have provided all the finance required to fund the entire Industrial
26. Work ethic and patience are important not only for investments but also
for innovation, as witnessed by Edison’s famous statement that invention is one
percent inspiration and ninety-nine percent perspiration. Mokyr (1990, p. 241)
argues that preindustrial Britain benefited from the arrival of skilled workers
fleeing anti-Protestant prosecution in France. Our theory suggests that this exodus
may have fostered both the entrepreneurial spirit and the innovative capability
that later on fueled the Industrial Revolution in Britain.
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Revolution. However, those (and other elite) families chose not
to redirect their existing portfolios to meet either the relatively
small demands of the manufacturing sector—demands that were
met largely out of retained earnings—or much more importantly,
the demands for supporting investment in infrastructure, partic-
ularly canal construction.”
The lack of industrial investment is only one indication of
the low patience of the upper class. If the members of the upper
class were truly lacking in patience, they should have been un-
willing to invest in other kinds of financial assets as well. The
historical evidence supports this implication. Well before the In-
dustrial Revolution, the British government became a major bor-
rower, with multiple bond issues (mostly for war finance) through-
out the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. These bonds were
mostly purchased by the urban middle classes, whereas the con-
tribution of the landed classes was insignificant (Dickson 1967,
p. 302). The financing of early public companies follows the same
pattern. Bowen (1989, p. 195) documents that most stockholders
of the East India Company between 1756 and 1791 were “cler-
gymen, bankers, military and naval personnel, officials, brokers,
merchants large and small, and retailers,” whereas “beyond doubt
there was no large-scale investment in the Company by the landed
interest or aristocracy.” The preindustrial elite thus played a sur-
prisingly minor role in financing government borrowing and pri-
vate enterprise well before the Industrial Revolution, despite be-
ing far wealthier than the middle class. This stands in marked
contrast to the wealth elites in modern industrial countries, who
generally own disproportionate shares of most types of assets, in-
cluding government debt and public stock (see Carroll [2001] for
evidence on the United States).27
Rather than investing the rents derived from their estates,
many landowners used their land as collateral to borrow money.
The scale of this borrowing substantially increased when long-
term mortgage loans were introduced after the Glorious Revo-
lution of 1688. Beckett (1986, p. 300) reports that by the mid-
eighteenth century “many families already had an accumulation
[of debt] several generations old.”28 Money was usually borrowed
not to finance improvement in existing estates or to buymore land,
27. Notice that our theory does not posit that landowners were always im-
patient; in fact, the first aristocrats in a dynasty, who initially acquired title and
estate, may plausibly have been particularly patient.
28. See also Temin and Voth (2007).
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but to close the mismatch between expenditure and income:29
“Rents and royalties were apparently being sucked into con-
spicuous consumption and frittered away in spiraling marriage
contracts; and the gap between getting and spending was filled
not by offloading assets such as land, but by borrowing from—
in effect—the commercial, industrial, and shopkeeping members
of the populace” (Beckett [1986, p. 316]; see also Devine [1971],
Porter [1982], and Kindleberger [1993, p. 175]). Aristocratic in-
debtedness grew severely during the nineteenth century, and in
1847 an observer claimed that “between half and two-thirds of
English land was encumbered (i.e., mortgaged)” (Beckett 1986,
p. 315). Cannadine (1994, p. 49) summarizes the situation as fol-
lows: “Whatever might have been the financial state of individual
families, it seems clear that the landed aristocracy as a class was
in debt through the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century.”
Given our hypothesis of a low propensity to invest among the
upper classes, one might wonder why the aristocracy did not sim-
ply sell land to middle-class buyers. One reason is that the land
market in Britain was subject to pervasive legal restrictions that
made selling land costly or even impossible. Most large estates
were entailed, meaning that they could neither be split nor sold
by the owner.30 Mortgaging their land to merchants and banks
was therefore the only way in which, de facto, many landowners
could run down their assets. Eventually, after statutory reforms
and changes in the common law eased the restrictions on land
sales, many families overburdened by debt did sell off part or all
of their estates. By that time, the economic problems of the upper
classes—aggravated by falling land rents after 1878—had become
so pressing that land sales reached a massive scope. Cannadine
(1990, p. 89) summarizes the dismantling of aristocratic landown-
ership during the first part of the twentieth century as follows:
“The scale of this territorial transfer was rivaled only by two other
29. Thompson (1994) documents that since 1700, landowners progressively
withdrew from day-to-day involvement in the management of their estates. The
investments and technical innovations in agriculture during the eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries, which played an important role in the British Indus-
trial Revolution, were carried out almost entirely by tenant farmers. According to
Cannadine (1994, pp. 48–49), most debt was taken on with the objective of “the
enhancement of the social prestige and the fulfillment of the traditional responsi-
bilities of the landowner. . . .To the extent that such self-indulgent activities were
financed from middle- and working-class savings, . . . this definitely amounted to a
‘haemorrhage of capital,’ a ‘misallocation of resources,’ as funds from urban and
industrial Britain were diverted to underpin the indulgence of the landed order.”
30. Through the institution of entail, an aristocratic landowner could prevent
his descendants from selling part or all of the estate.
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landed revolutions in Britain this Millennium: The Norman Con-
quest and the Dissolution of the Monasteries.” Although other
factors (taxation, decline of land rents) contributed to this final
outcome, a clear thread links the chronic indebtedness of the
landed aristocracy over centuries with its eventual decline and
inability to hold onto the land.
Our theory predicts that the economic changes triggered by
the Industrial Revolution should feed back on preferences. Among
the thriving bourgeoisie, we should observe an increasing appre-
ciation of leisure and ultimately a decline in economic success.31
Indeed, social historians (see, e.g., Cunningham [1980]) document
a surge in the demand for leisure by the bourgeois middle class
in the second half of the nineteenth century, reflecting a wan-
ing of the austere values of the early days of industrialization:
“At mid-century the Victorian middle class had been suspicious
of the moral temptations of a beckoning leisure world, but had
rapidly learned to assimilate it to their culture . . .By the end of
the century prescriptions had become more permissive—from ‘Be
virtuous and you will be happy’ to ‘Be happy and you will be
virtuous’—and middle class leisure grew more expansive and as-
sured” (Bailey 1989, p. 110). The changing preferences also af-
fected other spheres of private and social life. To some extent,
the appetite for consumption and leisure crowded out religion,
in line with Weber’s secularization hypothesis. Religious fervor,
earlier a defining trait of the urban middle class, started fad-
ing in the second half of the century. Activities competing with
leisure such as daily family prayers declined: “Remaining in the
proper frame in mind . . .when the smell of bacon and coffee as-
sailed one’s nose . . .was too much for most of the younger genera-
tion and slowly the custom was shifted to once a week on Sunday
evenings, and, as leisure activities for all age groups grew more
varied, was finally abandoned” (Davidoff 1973, p. 35).32 The new
31. It should be noted, however, that our theory does not imply that the gen-
trified middle class will ultimately resemble the landed elite in all dimensions. In
particular, unlike investing in the work ethic, the accumulation of patience is self-
reinforcing over time and may lead to persistent cultural and economic differences
between the classes. As in the example discussed in Section IV.B, industrial dy-
nasties may continue to accumulate wealth, albeit at a lower rate, once the switch
from work ethic to a heightened appreciation of leisure has taken place.
32. Obelkevich (1990, p. 338–346) summarizes the changing attitude of the
middle class toward religious values as follows: “It was in the middle classes
that the Victorian religious boom had the biggest impact . . . In the 1870s the first
signs appeared that the long period of growth was coming to an end. Though
membership was still increasing, it failed to keep pace with the growth in the
population, and church going actually began to decline: in middle-class districts
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material experience of themiddle class had ceased to be congruent
with the rigid Puritan doctrine.
The change of values also affected the “industrial spirit,”
which according to Wiener (1981) started to decline after reach-
ing its high-water mark with the Great Exhibition of 1851. At
that time, many of the industrial dynasties underwent a pro-
cess of gentrification and absorbed some of the values of the
landed elite. “Sometimes successful industrialists left business
altogether; other times they stayed in business, but viewed it
ever more as a social duty rather than an economic opportunity”
(Wiener 1981, p. 147). Florence (1953, p. 303, cited in Wiener
1981) argues that for the hereditary manager “the pecuniary in-
centive to large-scale expansion . . .may be weak, since the family
are already well-established. The transpecuniary objects are of-
ten stability and a conventional standard of life with plenty of
leisure and long weekends devoted to sports and other gentle-
manly pursuits rather than making one’s way farther up the lad-
der.” Consistent with these changing preferences, we observe a
waning of entrepreneurial success among entrepreneurial dynas-
ties as family firms are passed on from the founding fathers to
subsequent generations (the “Buddenbrooks” effect). In an empir-
ical study of 1,149 British business leaders born between 1789
and 1937, Nicholas (1999b, pp. 706–707) documents that “there
is a comparatively low lifetime rate of wealth accumulation for
firm inheritors. The older the dynasty, the lower is the rate of
return. Third-generation entrepreneurs clearly underperformed
relative to firm founders or managers.” This observation is at odds
with a purely genetic view of entrepreneurial skills and preference
transmission.33
in London attendance fell by more than a third between 1886 and 1902. Such
hallmarks of Victorian religiosity as strict Sunday observance and family prayers
were being abandoned . . .Behind the statistics of falling attendances lay a deeper
disaffection from the churches and their messages.” The same author documents
how the different churches responded by softening their message and precepts.
33. The decline in the spirit of capitalism within industrial dynasties had
already struck contemporary observers. For instance, Alfred Marshall (1920,
pp. 299–300) writes: “It would . . .at first sight seem likely that business men
should constitute a sort of caste; . . .But the actual state of things is very
different. . . . [W]hen aman has got together a great business, his descendants often
fail, in spite of their great advantage, to develop the high abilities and special turn
of mind and temperament required for carrying it on with equal success. . . .When
a full generation has passed . . . then the business almost invariably falls to pieces.”
A related argument is the “Carnegie conjecture,” that is, Andrew Carnegie’s (1962)
assertion that wealth “deadens the talents and energies” of children. Holtz-Eakin,
Joulfaian, and Rosen (1993) provide evidence from the PSID that inherited wealth
depresses labor supply. This is consistent with our model.
784 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
VI. DISCUSSION OF ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES
The mechanism outlined in this paper is not the only possi-
ble explanation of the changing fortunes of different social classes
throughout the Industrial Revolution. A first alternative hypoth-
esis is that the relative decline of the aristocracy was driven by
changes in the value of land rather than the failure to embrace
industrialization. Indeed, the crisis that started in the late nine-
teenth century coincidedwith a period of rapidly falling land rents.
However, viewed over the entire industrialization period, rents
increased substantially—arguably an effect of the growth in in-
dustrial production and the associated population boom—and the
decline that occurred after 1878 only partially offset the earlier
run up.34 On the whole it appears as if the evolution of rents over
time may have first delayed and then accelerated the economic
decline of the landowning class, rather than being its ultimate
cause. More generally, the robust prediction of our theory is a rel-
ative, but not necessarily absolute, economic decline. Consistent
with this prediction, even during the period of rapidly rising rents
the wealth growth of the aristocracy did not keep pace with that
of new industrialists (as noted in the previous section).
Another hypothesis is that the upper classes were excluded
from industrialization because urban workers possessed skills
that were essential for industrial activities, whereas the landown-
ers did not. For certain sectors and activities, there is indeed ev-
idence that prior experience was important in determining who
would become an entrepreneur.35 However, when we consider the
entire range of industrial activities, the evidence suggests that
differences in skills cannot be the only or main explanation. A sig-
nificant share of the new industrialists had not previously been
involved in any form of manufacturing. For instance, as many
as 22% of the industrialists’ fathers were yeomen and farmers,
34. According to Turner, Beckett, and Afton (1997, Table A2.1), rents per
acre tripled between 1790 and 1878 and fell by 27% between 1878 and 1910.
Within the period, there were sharp increases between 1790 and 1815 (124%) and
1850 and 1878 (37%) and a period of flat rents in between. Clark (2007, Figure
14.2), who focuses on real rents per acre for farmland, reports a less pronounced
increase and a sharper fall after 1878. Nevertheless, the overall pattern is the
same. One important factor that is associated with the evolution of land rents is
the introduction of the Corn Laws in 1815 and their ultimate repeal in 1846. The
effect of theCornLaws on rents is controversial, though. For instance,Moore (1965)
argues that they were not particularly effective in sustaining high agricultural
prices. After the repeal of the Corn Laws, grain imports gradually increased, but
rents actually increased over the following thirty years.
35. Skills and experience in related activities were particularly important in
the textile industry (see Crouzet [1985, pp. 116–125, and also footnote 79, p. 206]).
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TABLE II
PROFESSIONAL CHOICES OF CAMBRIDGE GRADUATES, IN PERCENT
1752–1799 1800–1849 1850–1899
Church 60 62 38
Land-owning 14 14 7
Teaching 9 9 12
Law 6 9 14
Administration 3 1 6
Medicine 1 2 7
Banking 0 0 2
Business 0 0 5
Other 7 3 9
Source. Jenkins and Jones (1950, Table 1).
groups with no experience in industrial activity (Crouzet 1985,
Table 8). Moreover, there is evidence of substantial mobility across
industrial sectors. Crouzet reports that no more than 40% of the
fathers of the industrialists in his sample worked either in the
same industry or in an industry or trade with forward or back-
ward linkages with the branch in which they set up. Landowners
were therefore not at a particular disadvantage in terms of their
skills relative to many of the middle-class entrepreneurs. In fact,
a number of key sectors during industrialization (such as mining,
railways, and canals) required land as a major input. In these sec-
tors, if anything, the landowners should have had an advantage
over middle-class city dwellers.
A related argument is that the landowners, busy managing
their rural estates, may have lacked the time and opportunity
to enter industrial activities, which mostly took place in or near
cities. However, many landowners did not actively manage their
estates. Even more telling, it was not only the heirs of estates who
shunned business activity; second and third sons of landowners
did so as well. These younger sons had no choice but to enter some
activity other than landowning and were therefore not held back
by their obligations to an existing estate. Nevertheless, they did
not enter business in any larger numbers than their landown-
ing fathers. For instance, consider Table II, which reports the
occupational choices of Cambridge graduates during the period
1750–1899. The vast majority of students at Cambridge during
this period were sons of the landowning class, so their occupa-
tional choices (other than landowning) give us some idea of which
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professions younger sons entered.36 Strikingly, until 1850, not a
single graduate got involved in banking or business (widely de-
fined as any “profit-oriented activity”), and even after 1850 the
percentage remains surprisingly low. This evidence is corrobo-
rated by the study of Crouzet (1985), who documents that few of
the new industrialists’ fathers were landowners (see footnote 21).
The arguments discussed so far do not rely on group-specific
preferences. We now turn to explanations that do involve hetero-
geneity in preferences, but of a different nature than in our model.
Cain and Hopkins (1993, p. 23) argue that a social norm against
the involvement in entrepreneurial activities excluded the British
aristocracy from industrial capitalism: “A gentleman required in-
come, and preferably sizeable wealth, but was not to be sullied
by the acquisitive process.” To the extent to which this exclusion
was a matter of personal preference and (possibly acquired) taste,
this thesis coincides with our explanation. However, as the classi-
cal theory of Veblen (1994) suggests, social norms may also have
served as an instrument of social exclusion. A gentleman violating
the norm would lose the recognition of his peers, with potentially
grave consequences for social standing and access to aristocratic
privileges. In this case, the enforcement would be partly extrin-
sic: even a gentleman enjoying hard work in principle may prefer
to shun work in practice to avoid social sanctions. Interestingly,
Veblen argued that the emphasis on leisure and refined tastes
became a natural instrument of social exclusion precisely because
the income process of the aristocrats granted them abundant free
time, whereas members of other classes had no choice but to work:
“Abstention from labour is the conventional evidence of wealth
and is therefore the conventional mark of social standing; and
this insistence on the meritoriousness of wealth leads to a more
strenuous insistence on leisure” (Veblen 1994, p. 26). Thus, the
social norm may have its roots in the same economic conditions
that generate class-specific preferences in our theory.
The individual-preference and the social-norm approaches
share many predictions for individual behavior, making it diffi-
cult to discriminate the two models empirically. One indication for
the importance of individual preferences is that the “gentlemanly
values” of the upper class persisted even after the aristocracy
lost its predominance. If social norms had no function other than
36. One group missing here is those choosing the military career, who would
attend a military academy instead of Oxford or Cambridge.
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serving as an instrument of social exclusion, we would expect
these norms to disappear once aristocratic privileges lost their
value. The historical evidence suggests that aristocratic norms not
only persisted, but even spread to other social classes throughout
the nineteenth century.37 This observation is inconsistent with
an explanation for class-specific preferences based on social ex-
clusion alone, because members of lower classes could not have
gained access to social and economic privileges by merely imitat-
ing the tastes of the upper class.38
Perkin (1969) and Mokyr (1999) take the argument one step
further and argue that acquiring gentlemanly status was an end
to itself. In this view, both the initial accumulation of wealth and
the later increase in leisure and ostentatious consumption can be
interpreted as means to the end of first acquiring and later dis-
playing social status. As in our interpretation, the economic slow-
down of the industrial dynasties is a conscious choice, albeit for a
different reason. Whereas in our theory the increase in leisure is
driven by a change in preferences, in Perkin and Mokyr it is part
of the aristocratic ideal to which they had always aspired.
A last possibility is that aspects of preferences other than
patience and leisure appreciation were driving the economic deci-
sions of different social classes during the Industrial Revolution.
For example, risk aversion or attitudes towards innovation may
have also been relevant to the emergence of a spirit of capitalism,
although these traits would apply mainly to entrepreneurship
narrowly conceived rather than to the general attitude towards
investments. Extending the analysis to these additional aspects
of preferences may provide further insights. For instance, simi-
larly to the case of patience, financial development would tend to
equalize the attitudes toward risk across dynasties engaged in dif-
ferent professions. However, it might induce parents to encourage
37. When Britain went into economic decline relative to competitors such as
Germany and the United States after 1870, much of the blame was placed on
the British educational system (in particular, the public schools and Oxbridge)
for spreading aristocratic anti-business and anti-industrial attitudes to the upper
middle classes; see the extensive discussion in Rubinstein (1993).
38. Although the industrial elite ultimately started to appreciate leisure, for
the most part it did not acquire the main prerequisite of aristocratic privilege,
that is, land. For instance, Nicholas (1999a) notes that “those who made fortunes
in business . . .did not purchase or inherit land on large scale. This was despite
the fact that their wealth gave them an unprecedented opportunity for land ac-
quisition.” Indeed, many preferred renting land for their leisure’s sake but did not
bother with buying it. This suggests that leisure had intrinsic appeal to them,
rather than being enjoyed solely for the purpose of social advancement (see also
Rubinstein [1981, 1996]).
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risk-taking behavior in their children, contrary to the analysis of
patience in this paper, where financial development reduces the
incentive to invest in patience.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The modern theory of economic growth focuses on changes
in material conditions and standards of living while ignoring,
with few exceptions, the role of culture. This approach is legit-
imate as long as culture, while possibly being shaped by economic
conditions, does not feed back into economic decisions. Recently,
however, a number of economists have uncovered growing evi-
dence that preferences, culture, and religion are important deter-
minants of economic decisions and outcomes.
In this paper, we have developed a theory where economic
conditions and culture are mutually interlinked. The theory can
account for a number of observations about the British Industrial
Revolution, such as the emergence of a spirit of capitalism among
the urban middle class, as well as the subsequent replacement
of the landed aristocracy by industrial capitalists as the socioe-
conomic elite. Consistent with evidence provided by social histo-
rians, the theory also predicts that the economic success of the
bourgeoisie should ultimately lead to a cultural transformation of
this class.
The theory shows that stratification of preferences across oc-
cupations may occur even in an initially homogeneous society. In
reality, historical accidents may have fostered the stratification
process. For instance, the political and religious forces behind the
success of the Protestant Reformation may have contributed to
the formation and transmission of preferences conducive to hard
work and wealth accumulation. Likewise, demographic changes
such as increasing longevity may also have played a role. A
longer life horizon would tend to increase an agent’s propensity
to accumulate human capital and material wealth, reinforcing
the effects of technological shocks at the time of the Industrial
Revolution.
Although the analysis targets a specific historical episode,
we expect the theory developed in this paper to be applicable to
other open questions in macroeconomics and economic growth.
For instance, a recent macroeconomic literature argues that pref-
erence heterogeneity is key for explaining portfolio choices and the
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dynamics of the wealth distribution in modern economies.39 Our
theory provides a new mechanism for the emergence and trans-
mission of heterogeneous preferences. The theory also offers a new
perspective on the impact of financial development on economic
development. These and other aspects of endogenous preference
formation are left to future research.
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